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Abstract: 
Recent studies of policy and policy actors in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
have made use of the policy entrepreneur concept which has been popular in studies 
of policy in North America and Europe. These approaches have understood the 
concept in its traditional form dealing with agenda setting and non-state actors. The 
policy entrepreneur has developed beyond these confines and now offers a broader 
descriptive framework within which to understand the successes and failures of 
particular initiatives. 
 
This paper uses these new developments, specifically the framework outlined by 
Mintrom and Norman (2009), to describe the success of policy entrepreneurship in 
the development of the urban resident Minimum Livelihood Guarantee (MLG). 
This case was selected because existing scholarship has ignored the entrepreneurial 
role of bureaucrats in its development. The use of this framework without 
adaptation to describe policy actors in China demonstrates the further application of 
policy entrepreneurs outside of Western democracies. 
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Introduction 
The process of opening up and reform has in terms of policy studies made two significant 
differences to research on the People’s Republic of China (PRC). On the one hand, those 
concerned with the emergence, development and implementation of policy in the PRC have 
had greater opportunities for observing and studying the policy process than would have 
seemed possible in the Maoist era. On the other hand, China has gone through a profound 
transformation since 1978 not just in economic policy but in many other areas as well. This 
has meant that whilst we now know more than ever before about the workings of the policy 
process in the PRC a great deal of scholarly work and output has focused on addressing the 
changes and outcomes of specific policy developments rather than addressing theories and 
frameworks which aid our understanding of the policy process. This article will contribute to 
an emerging and exciting introduction to policy studies in China, the concept of policy 
entrepreneurship. It will specifically tackle how policy entrepreneurs contribute to the policy 
process based on the case of the urban resident Minimum Livelihood Guarantee (MLG) 
system between 1994 and 1997. 
 
The role of actors in the policy process is an area which has attracted attention from China 
scholars both before and after China opened up. The elite factionalism model, best 
encapsulated in the debate between Tsou (Tsou, 1976) and Nathan (Nathan, 1973, Nathan, 
1976), focuses on the clashes between elite leaders and their factions. Policy developments 
are the result of these clashes and reflect the ascendance or collapse of a particular faction 
within the upper tiers of the PRC government. Emerging in the late 1980s the fragmented 
authoritarianism (FA) model combined an understanding of policy actors as bounded rational 
decision makers operating within a structure of institutionalised constraints and fragmentation 
which often led to policy actors bargaining and negotiating policy developments (Lampton, 
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1987b, Lampton, 1987a, Lampton, 1992, Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988, Lieberthal, 1992). 
Studies of reforms in social security, but not the MLG, reflect the findings of the FA model 
and implicitly challenge the assertion that factional elites dominate the policy process 
(Beland and Yu, 2004, Duckett, 2001, Duckett, 2003, Frazier, 2004a, Frazier, 2004b) The 
common theme to these works on social policy reform is that policy actors, at both elite and 
bureaucratic level, are important when explaining the outcomes of policy in the PRC.  
 
There have also been recent efforts to introduce new concepts to address policy actors in 
contemporary China with the policy entrepreneur offering much promise (Mertha, 2009, Zhu, 
2008). Policy entrepreneurship became a popular concept with Kingdon’s seminal text on 
agenda setting in the United States (US) policy process. Kingdon sees policy entrepreneurs as 
the key actor when bringing together the different streams of policy issues (the problem, 
politics and ideas) through the exploitation of so-called policy windows in the policy process 
(Kingdon, 1984). Policy entrepreneurs are identified as actors who can occupy any part of the 
political arena and are motivated by many different factors which can range from ideological 
beliefs to a “love of the game”. The policy entrepreneur concept has been popular in policy 
studies and has appeared in a number of other explanations of the policy process such as 
punctuated equilibrium (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, Baumgartner and Jones, 1991) and 
the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier, 1988, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). Both 
Zhu (2008) and Mertha (2009) reflect the traditional focus of the policy entrepreneur as an 
actor who helps to shape or capture the agenda in order to promote a particular policy 
solution. In the case of Zhu’s (2008) contribution significant adaptation of the concept was 
required through the introduction of case specific actor tactics in order to fit with the case 
investigated. 
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The concept of the policy entrepreneur has not been stagnant since Kingdon’s contribution. In 
particular studies of the US policy process (but not exclusively), there is a growing 
recognition that policy entrepreneurs are neither exclusive to the agenda setting stage and nor 
are they exclusive to particular elites or campaigning advocates (Mintrom and Norman, 2009, 
Teodoro, 2009, Meier, 2009, Nowlin, 2011). This raises new questions and possibilities, such 
as the role of policy entrepreneurs beyond agenda setting and within the bureaucracy, for 
study in China and it is this opportunity that this paper will engage with. 
 
In their discussion of policy entrepreneurs and policy change Mintrom and Norman (2009) 
provide both a clear definition of what a policy entrepreneur is and also a clear framework
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for describing the success or failure of a policy entrepreneur. This paper will use this 
framework to explore the role of policy actors in the development of one particular policy 
development, the urban resident Minimum Livelihood Guarantee system (MLG or dibao 
hereafter), a minimum income guarantee system first introduced during the 1990s. This case 
                                                 
2
 Throughout this paper I use the term concept when referring to policy entrepreneurs and 
framework when referring to Mintrom and Norman’s contribution. Referring to policy 
entrepreneurs as a concept is not controversial and has been standard practice in the literature 
(for example Kingdon, 1984: 122). The term and use of policy entrepreneur also satisfies 
more defined parameters for being a concept put forward by some researchers (Jabareen, 
2009). 
Referring to the contribution made by Mintrom and Norman as a framework is more 
contentious. Both Ostrom (2007) and Schlager (2007), for example, present clear arguments 
regarding what a framework is and the relationship between frameworks, theories and models 
when seeking to analyse and explain the policy process. The “elements of policy 
entrepreneurship” presented by Mintrom and Norman (2009: 650) fits best with the idea of a 
framework working as a means to “bound inquiry and direct the attention of the analyst to 
critical features of the social and physical landscape” (Schlager, 2007: 293); the alternative, 
following Schlager’s distinction between the three terms, would require much more specific 
values to be allocated to the “elements” and this is not done. What Mintrom and Norman 
present is not theory or a model. In addition, the idea that a framework provides a “meta-
theoretical language” (Schlager, 2007: 293) which would allow scholars to compare different 
theories also fits with the “elements” as presented by Mintrom and Norman. A final point is 
recognising that such a distinction is not without difficulties and the boundaries between 
these labels can be subjective and as a result “fuzzy” (Stanley, 2012: 475; Shanahan, Jones 
and McBeth, 2011: 556). 
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is used because the move from the traditional category based social assistance system in 
China to dibao was a radical change and it also saw significant roles played by particular 
policy actors. There has, however, been a limited discussion of the role played by specific 
bureaucratic actors in the existing literature on the MLG (Gao, 2006, Guan and Xu, 2011, 
Leung, 2006, Leung and Wong, 1999, Solinger, 2001, Solinger, 2005, Solinger, 2011, Tang, 
2003, Tang, 2005, Shang and Wu, 2004, Gao et al., 2011, Gao et al., 2009, Saunders and 
Shang, 2001, Saunders and Sun, 2006). It is a case which lacks an explanation of policy 
change focused on the role of particular actors.  
 
To this end the article will be structured as follows. A more detailed discussion of the 
literature and theory informing the choice of Mintrom and Norman’s framework follows 
immediately. This is then followed by a description of the methods used for collecting and 
analysing the evidence presented here. I then outline the definitions and approach developed 
by Mintrom and Norman (2009) in their discussion of policy entrepreneurs and policy change. 
The MLG is then introduced and a brief history of the program is set out. Next, I discuss 
policy entrepreneurship with special reference to the role played by Minister of Civil Affairs 
Duoji Cairang between 1994 and 1997. In the next section I address the issue of how to avoid 
what Mintrom and Norman refer to as “indiscriminate application” (2009: 650). I then 
conclude by discussing the application of policy entrepreneurs as a descriptive framework for 
understanding the policy process in China and possible future avenues for research in the 
PRC. 
 
Theoretical Discussion 
The transfer and application of a descriptive framework developed for a particular political 
system to another very different system presents a number of questions that should be 
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addressed. First, is it possible to transfer a framework from a liberal democratic system to an 
authoritarian system. Policy entrepreneurship may have originated and been applied with 
success in liberal democratic political systems but one of the most appealing characteristics 
of the concept is that it is not dependent on particular features of such a system. There is no 
inbuilt necessity that policy entrepreneurs appear only in systems which have elections or a 
free media. 
 
In addition the policy entrepreneur concept has been adopted, and in some cases adapted, 
with success to describe developments in certain aspects of Chinese policy change.  Mertha 
(2009) uses policy entrepreneurs as Kingdon (1984) describes them to describe the actions of 
particular officials and campaigners seeking policy changes in environmental policy. Mertha 
highlights that the existing understanding of Chinese authoritarianism as fragmented is 
particularly important because it allows space for entrepreneurs to operate. In contrast, Zhu 
adapts the policy entrepreneur to suit the Chinese case examined suggesting that the different 
political system means that entrepreneurs have to play up the pragmatic side of their policy 
preferences by presenting “technically unfeasible” alternatives (2008). 
 
Finally I would argue that the Chinese system is, in spite of its authoritarian nature, not the 
monolithic top-down state machine which Beijing presents and Western observers perceive. 
There is space within the political system and hierarchy of the bureaucracy for individuals, or 
groups of like-minded individuals, to have an impact on the policy process. This has been 
recognised since the late 1970s and the discussion of factions within the elite leadership 
affecting policy decisions (Nathan 1973, 1976, Tsou, 1976).  Goodman et al (1984) 
demonstrated that even in the early period of reform and opening there was space for groups 
to advocate and pursue their policy preferences, albeit with limited success, from within the 
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bureaucratic structure of the Chinese state. The final contribution worth noting here is that of 
Lieberthal and Oksenberg’s fragmented authoritarianism model (1988) which highlighted the 
role of the bureaucracy, as agents and structure, in China’s policy making. The key element 
here is recognition that the Chinese system is fragmented and this provides the opportunities 
for the bureaucracy, at different levels of the system, to influence policy. Initially this led to a 
focus on the conflicts between agencies within the bureaucracy but as Mertha (2009) 
demonstrates this fragmented authoritarianism also provides opportunities for policy 
entrepreneurs to influence the policy process. These studies of China contribute both to 
theoretical (Bentley, 1908) and empirical (Skilling, 1970, 1983, Skilling and Griffiths, 1971) 
studies which have argued against the simplistic notion that authoritarian bureaucratic 
systems squeeze out all possibility of individual entrepreneurial behaviour in the policy 
process.  
 
A second question regarding the use of a particular approach also needs to be addressed: what 
alternatives to Mintrom and Norman’s contribution are there and should these have been used? 
There are a number possible alternatives which could arguably have provided a framework in 
which to explain the role of Minister Duoji in the development of the MLG. The first to be 
considered would be Lieberthal and Oksenberg’s fragmented authoritarianism model (1988). 
Whilst the description of state structure within which individuals make and implement policy 
has been, to date, peerless the articulation of how individuals go about influencing policy is 
limited to a model of bounded rational decision making which, as I have argued elsewhere 
(Hammond, 2011 and 2011a), does not capture the dynamism of individual behaviour 
especially when a new policy is being pushed.  It is for these reasons, as well as additional 
concerns raised regarding China’s modernisation (Oksenberg, 2002), which suggests that 
alternative frameworks should be sought for describing actors within the bureaucracy.  
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Both Mertha (2009) and Zhu (2008) demonstrate the contribution that can be made to 
understanding Chinese policy making through the adoption one such alternative: the policy 
entrepreneur. Mertha (2009) uses the PE in a classical sense of identifying three different 
sorts and describing how they affect the policy process. The problems of using policy streams 
have been discussed elsewhere (Sabatier, 2007). Another issue raised by these studies is the 
adaptation of the concept to fit the Chinese case which is a point of concern because it, 
arguably, leads to the possibility of the concept being diluted or reshaped in order to achieve 
wider applicability. Zhu (2008) introduces the idea of technical infeasibility as a strategy for 
facilitating policy change. This did not occur in the case of the MLG and is also specific to 
particular actors who are commonly outside of the policy process in China. It is therefore an 
interesting contribution but of seemingly limited application outside of the particular case 
examined. 
 
Other approaches utilising policy entrepreneurs mentioned are resource or data intense. 
Specifically punctuated equilibrium relies first and foremost on extensive statistical data 
being available in order to identify the punctuations; this is generally not the case in China 
and absolutely not the case with regards to the MLG (Hammond, 2009, 2011 and 2011a). The 
ACF requires an early decision, methodologically, to adopt the tools with which to analyse a 
particular policy. It also implies competing factions regarding a policy brought together by 
the entrepreneur which was not apparent with the MLG. 
 
Mintrom and Norman provide a framework which can fit with existing theoretical 
contributions regarding China studies. Specifically the use of PEs, the existing understanding 
regarding China’s institutional structure and the impact this has on policy processes (the so-
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called FA model discussed previously) and a means to identify and to a limited degree 
explain the success or failure of a PE. The framework was also formulated with extensive 
application in mind as demonstrated in the original article. 
 
A final point is a number of recent studies have highlighted the use of the policy entrepreneur 
to describe the role played by bureaucrats in the policy process (Mintrom and Norman, 2009, 
Teodoro, 2009, Meier, 2009, Nowlin, 2011). The appeal of using Mintrom and Norman’s 
work is that it provides a means to utilise the policy entrepreneur using a qualitative approach 
within a clear framework. This means that this paper will address two points which make a 
contribution to both the China and policy studies disciplines: first, does the policy 
entrepreneur concept adequately describe the development of urban dibao; second, does 
Mintrom and Norman’s framework provide the means to identify, describe and evaluate the 
success of policy entrepreneurship in China without modification? 
 
Methods 
The findings presented in this paper are based on research conducted between 2005 and 2010 
as part of a wider study into the development and implementation of dibao between 1992 and 
2003. The primary output of this research was a PhD dissertation which argued, in part, for a 
conceptualisation of policy actors in the PRC which was very similar to the policy 
entrepreneur but sought to take account of the specifics of the Chinese system; this concept 
was called the policy sponsor and has been applied in the Chinese context elsewhere 
(Hammond, 2009 and 2011).  However, as the discussion of the literature above demonstrates, 
the creation of a new concept is a somewhat pointless exercise; this became increasingly clear 
when trying to condense a concept devised in the comfort of a thesis for more direct and brief 
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delivery in article form. This prompted a return to the original material collected and a re-
evaluation of the arguments against policy entrepreneurship being applied in China. 
 
In seeking to address the questions outlined above this papers adopts a single case study 
approach. The development of the Minimum Livelihood Guarantee system between 1994 and 
1997 will be the focus of this paper. This was the time when dibao moved from a local 
innovation to a nationally implemented program. As will be argued it was also during this 
time that the entrepreneurial activity of the Minister of Civil Affairs, Duoji Cairang, was most 
apparent and had the most significant impact. 
 
The case study approach has come under significant criticism for many years. I do recognise 
this criticism of case studies, and especially single case examples, which have been argued 
strongly by scholars such as King, Keohane and Verba (1994). In particular the argument that 
a single case may be subject to selection bias, limited scope, and have limited 
representativeness (George and Bennett, 2004; Devine, 2002: 204) and a broad concern 
regarding the generalisation of findings (Stake, 1978; Innes, 2001; Devine, 2002; Flyvbjerg, 
2006; Thomas, 2010 and 2011) are all issues of concern for scholars who study not just 
policy but all aspects of social life. 
 
In spite of these criticisms there is still, and there always will be, merit in the use of the case 
study (single or otherwise) as a method of social inquiry. Others have already adequately 
articulated the merits of the case study (George and Bennett, 2004; Flyvbjerg, 2006) but there 
are a number of points which are worth reporting here. 
 
11 
 
First, in Chinese studies, I would argue that a combination of the discipline’s development 
and the reality of the fieldwork combine to make single or small n case studies the default 
option for scholars of China. In terms of disciplinary development Chin studies is arguably 
still building its knowledge base regarding numerous developments. There is also a 
disjuncture between the ideal of practicing social research in the literature and the actual 
experience in the field (Heimer and Thøgersen, 2006 is an excellent contribution covering 
this issue). It is notable that in both the previous works cited which use the policy 
entrepreneur concept the researchers in question use either a single case study (Zhu, 2008) or 
a very limited number of cases (Mertha, 2009) but to great effect. 
 
Second, there is a widespread acceptance that the case study provides a richness of detail and 
description which is otherwise impossible to achieve. This allows for “a large amount of 
detail about the practices and process being studied” (Innes, 2001: 212) to be explored and 
analysed; similar sentiments, either directly articulated or inferred, can be found throughout 
the literature (Burnham et al, 2004: 53; Bryman, 2001: 51). Stake (1978) highlights the 
inherent strengths of the case study being built on the foundation of the “experience” and 
“knowledge” of the researcher. George and Bennett (2004) also argue that it is the possibility 
of detail which the case study approach presents which is its real strength in comparison to 
large n qualitative or quantitative approaches. 
 
Third, the criticism of generalizability and single case approaches has been extensively 
discussed. There are two positions which are apparent and I am sympathetic to both of them. 
The first is that, especially amongst qualitative researchers, generalizability is not an aim of 
social research because it is simply impossible to achieve (Thomas, 2010; Stake, 1978; 
Bryman, 2001: 50). The second position is that the case study approach can make a 
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contribution to generalizability but that it needs to be understood as part of an ongoing 
process of scholarly investigation and discussion (George and Bennett, 2004; Stake, 1978; 
Flyvbjerg, 2006; Devine, 2002). The consistent point made is that it is vitally important how 
a case study is conducted as well as why. 
 
The approach adopted in this paper embraces the single case study approach because of its 
strengths, not least the reality of working in China and the empirical detail and understanding 
which it can produce. I do, however, also recognise that because of this approach wider 
claims regarding findings need to be made carefully and with the understanding that this 
paper is a contribution to a developing discussion of policy entrepreneurs in China and is in 
no way conclusive of a general development. The use of a clear framework provides the 
means if other scholars so wish, to examine their own cases and as a result build a more 
convincing argument for, or against, the framework presented by Mintrom and Norman. 
 
Document and interview data was collected during two field trips. The first trip was made 
from June to September 2006 and I was hosted by the Social Work Department of the Zhou 
Enlai School of Government at Nankai University, Tianjin. This trip also included a two 
week visit to Anqing city in Anhui Province. The second trip was made from September to 
November 2007 and I was hosted by the Social Policy Research Centre at the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing. During both trips visits totalling three weeks were 
made to the Universities Service Centre at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, HK SAR. 
 
Interviews 
Selection and Arranging 
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Potential interviewees were identified from documents, websites and meetings. Once some 
interviews were conducted then snowballing could take place and this did lead to some 
additional contacts. Interviews were then arranged through the host institution. The only 
exception to this was the Anqing trip where interviews were arranged through a local contact. 
The significance of local contacts and host institutions as gatekeepers when conducting 
fieldwork in China cannot be emphasised enough. Who was available and whether I could 
interview them was dependent on their links with either my contacts, the host, or a 
recommendation following a previous interview.  
 
There was a random element which I would have preferred not to exist in establishing 
contacts and arranging interviews. Desired interviewees were not always available or 
arrangements were made on the basis of the hosts own contacts. On more than one occasion 
interviews were rearranged or cancelled at the last minute. This reflects the reality of 
conducting fieldwork and whilst more interviews may have been collected ultimately 
valuable data was gleaned from those that were conducted. In total 21 individuals were 
interviewed in Beijing, Tianjin, Anqing and Hong Kong. See Appendix A for an anonymous 
list of interviewees. 
 
Interview Format 
The interview format depended to a degree on the interviewee in question. Typically I would 
meet the interviewee at their place of work. Interviews were semi-structured and frequently 
vetted in advance. The questions asked varied depending on who was being interviewed and 
at what point during the project the interview was conducted. For example later on in the 
project interview questions became more specific in an effort to clarify or uncover particular 
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details. Typically the number of questions asked was less than 20. Interviews lasted between 
1 and 3 hours. 
 
In all but three cases the interviews were conducted in Chinese. In two of these cases the 
interviewee was European and English was the best option to communicate in. In the other 
case the interviewee switched between Chinese and English throughout the interview. 
 
In the majority of cases an “assistant” was assigned by the host institution and was present 
during interviews. 
 
Documents 
The Chinese language documents collected varied a great deal. The majority were official 
documents produced and made public by state organisations like the State Council or the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs. These included speeches, reports, circulars, notes from meetings 
and answers to submissions made by local Civil Affairs Bureaux. Other materials include 
newspaper articles, research reports, academic articles, official journals such as the Zhongguo 
Minzheng and Chinese books published on the subject by officials and researchers. In total at 
over 100 documents from the 1980s to 2000s were read and coded.  
 
Analysis 
Following a reading of materials an initial coding frame was established based on content, 
key words and phrases used. This frame was built on as more materials were read and coded 
until it achieved a stable format. See Appendix B for an edited example of the coding frame 
used. 
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From responses made in interviews, the documentary evidence and the themes developed 
from coding the basis of an argument was formed. Ideas were developed to explain the 
emergence of the MLG and were then critically assessed. Following the development of these 
ideas the documentary and interview material was returned to as part of this assessment. This 
process was cyclical over two years and saw the introduction of various ideas from other 
studies (the “theory” codes of 7xx in the coding frame which were used to highlight sections 
of text which supported a particular approach). The other codes included were based on them 
being mentioned in a text or interview and were arranged into groups or themes as 
appropriate. 
 
The Policy Entrepreneur and Policy Change Framework 
Kingdon’s definition of a policy entrepreneur is rather general providing some significant 
degree of space for interpretation and variation. In his own words: 
“Let us label these advocates policy entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs are not 
necessarily found in any one location in the policy community. They could be in or out of 
government, in elected or appointed positions, in interest groups or research organizations. 
But their defining characteristic, much as in the case of a business entrepreneur, is their 
willingness to invest their resources – time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money – in the 
hope of future return. That return might come to them in the form of policies of which they 
approve, satisfaction from participation, or even personal aggrandizement in the form of job 
security or career promotion” (Kingdon, 1984: 123) 
In other studies policy entrepreneurs can fill particular roles, capturing images and venues in 
punctuated equilibrium or facilitating change within a coalition for the advocacy coalition 
framework. Within their framework for the policy entrepreneurs and policy change Mintrom 
and Norman also apply a potentially broad definition of what a policy entrepreneur is which 
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still provides the rigour to avoid the concept becoming over used or over applied. Their 
definition is quoted below: 
 “Policy entrepreneurs distinguish themselves through their desire to significantly 
change current ways of doing things in their area of interest.” (Mintrom and Norman 2009: 
650) 
This definition will therefore be used as the means to identify policy entrepreneurs in the case 
of the MLG. 
 
Identifying policy entrepreneurs is only part of the framework. Mintrom and Norman also 
highlight four areas which they argue help to describe what makes a policy entrepreneur 
successful. First, policy entrepreneurs display what the authors call social acuity. In essence a 
policy entrepreneur shows an effective understanding of others and has the ability to engage 
in policy conversations through the acquisition of knowledge and connection to the policy in 
question (Mintrom and Norman 2009: 652). Second, policy entrepreneurs are effective at 
defining problems. This can take the form of suggesting that a crisis is unfolding or imminent, 
identifying and presenting the failings in the existing policy framework or by bringing in 
actors to support the entrepreneur from beyond the immediate policy sphere. Mintrom and 
Norman state that problem definition is always a political act because it ensures that 
important groups or individuals will pay attention to the entrepreneur and what they are 
seeking to achieve (652). The third area argues that policy entrepreneurs are effective at 
building teams. Team building can, in this case, vary from the formation of an effective, tight 
knit unit to a broad coalition of allies supporting the proposed policy change the entrepreneur 
in question is pursuing (653). Finally policy entrepreneurs identify themselves and work 
toward ensuring their goals are achieved through “leading by example” (653). One example 
given is foundations and charities piloting particular schemes they support. The entrepreneur 
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will promote the policy in question through demonstrating their commitment to the change. 
In addition the entrepreneur promotes the policy change by reducing the risk associated with 
it. If a particular program is shown to be working effectively then risk adverse voters, 
bureaucrats or enterprises are less likely to argue convincingly for the status quo. In electoral 
or legislative contexts such an action can switch the agenda from the “consequences of action 
to a focus on the consequences of inaction” (654).  
 
Mintrom and Norman add a final point to support their framework. They argue that the four 
points outlined above should all be present for a policy entrepreneur to be successful but this 
might not necessarily be the case. The context of a particular case study may demonstrate that 
a policy entrepreneur was successful in implementing significant changes in a policy area but 
without, perhaps, effectively building a team to support them through the policy process. In 
essence what Mintrom and Norman present here is “a starting point for thinking about the 
things that policy entrepreneurs might do to improve their chances of achieving success” 
(654). The strength of this approach is that it is rigid enough to provide a framework within 
which policy entrepreneurs can be identified and their successes explained but it is also 
flexible enough to explain failure or adapt to cases which do not necessarily demonstrate all 
the identified features described above. 
 
The MLG from 1994 to 1997 
The MLG is a means tested locally administered and financed program which supplements 
eligible household’s income. Individual households apply to the local authorities who then 
investigate their monthly income. If the applicant’s income is determined to be below the 
locally set MLG line then a monetary benefit is provided to bring the household income up to 
the MLG line. The MLG first appeared in the city of Shanghai in June 1993. This followed 
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investigations and discussions of possibly policy changes which had started in 1992. The 
policy was introduced as part of a two branch approach to alleviating local urban poverty. 
The other branch introduced was a minimum wage system. These policies were introduced 
with little fanfare and received little attention although both would go on to become 
significant national programs.  
 
The MLG’s development from the local initiative in Shanghai to national implementation is 
at times presented as part of an overall plan by central government (Leung, 2006) or as fitting 
into a neat stages process (Tang, 2003). As I have argued elsewhere this is not the case and 
the MLG was subject to a disjointed development with cities adopting the policy in no clear 
pattern early on and with no interventions from the State Council until at least 1996 
(Hammond, 2011a). The MLG was only adopted by a small number of cities after 1994. In 
1994 7 cities had adopted the measure, by 1995 this had increased to 12 and by 1996 this had 
become 101 cities. In 1997, the year that the MLG was implemented nationally through a 
State Council circular (State-Council, 1997), the number of cities with MLG systems was 334 
(Hammond, 2011a). This was still substantially short of the 2310 cities which had 
implemented the MLG by 1999 (Fan, 2000). In addition to the slow growth of the MLG the 
competing models of MLG administration, coverage and financing also suggests that the idea 
of a planned implementation from 1993 through to 1997 is misleading (Hammond, 2011a). 
 
Until 1996 when Premier Li Peng reported on the MLG it was a policy pushed by the MCA 
and in particular Minister Duoji Cairang (Li, 1998b). Understanding the development of the 
MLG requires a different approach because it does not easily fit with available frameworks in 
Chinese studies. There was no elite interest until the later stages of the policy’s development 
which, for a full explanation, rules out factionalism. The FA model is limited here as well 
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because of the lack of resources involved and the absence of inter-Ministry bargaining. It is 
into this explanatory gap that the policy entrepreneur concept fits and can offer an 
explanation as to why the MLG developed the way it did. 
 
Identifying Duoji Cairang as a Policy Entrepreneur 
Mintrom and Norman’s definition of a policy entrepreneur identifies Duoji Cairang because 
he is distinguished by a clear desire to significantly change the existing way of doing things 
in his area of interest. This assumes that we take the remit of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, 
which includes social assistance policy, as his area of interest. The significance of Minister 
Duoji’s link with the MLG does not stop with simple association by institutional remit. His 
link to the MLG and the corresponding inference of a commitment to significant change are 
demonstrated through documentary and interview evidence as well as Duoji’s own actions 
throughout the 1990s. 
 
Evidence collected and analysed during fieldwork trips in 2006 and 2007 showed that Duoji 
was perceived as being particularly high profile when it came to the promotion of the MLG 
after 1993. A senior MCA official identified Duoji as fundamental to the emergence and 
development of the MLG during the 1990s (Interview with MCA Department Head, Beijing, 
2007). Duoji also published high profile texts supporting the MLG including two books on 
the MLG, social assistance, social welfare and the reform process (Duoji, 1995c, Duoji, 
2001). He also published editorials on the MLG in the Jingji Ribao (Economic Daily) and 
Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), setting out the MLG through these mouthpiece publications 
(Duoji, 1995d, Duoji, 1998e). Duoji attended and gave speeches at various meetings related 
to the MLG and wider social assistance policies which will be discussed in more detail below. 
Finally, Duoji was visibly active on the MLG over a sustained period of time which straddled 
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multiple stages of the policy process giving speeches and writing on the policy in 1994 
through to 1997. 
 
Duoji’s interest in the MLG is further highlighted by the transition to him as Minister being 
marked by a noticeable drop in Ministry level interest in other policy areas. For example 
Duoji’s appointment as Minister of Civil Affairs in 1993 corresponded with the stalling of 
any significant action on community construction until 2000.
3
 Finally, the activity of Duoji 
regarding the MLG was significant in numerical terms. For example over 50% of available 
speeches and editorials released by the MCA on the MLG from 1994-1995 were delivered or 
written by Duoji Cairang
4
. The speeches given, work meetings attended, and editorials 
written could have all been dealt with by another more junior member of the MCA 
bureaucracy. As Minister Duoji could have delegated authority to a Vice Minister or even the 
Departmental Director for Disaster Relief and Social Relief, which would have day to day 
responsibility for running social relief at the time, in order to push the MLG within the MCA. 
This was not the case, it was Duoji Cairang who gave the speeches, wrote editorials, and 
actively connected himself with the policy. 
 
Duoji’s association with the MLG, and his importance as a policy entrepreneur, is clear when 
the number of cities adopting the program is investigated. As noted above between 1993 and 
1994, the emergence of the MLG and Duoji’s first high profile endorsement, a small number 
of cities had adopted the program: only 2 in 1993 and 7 by the end of 1994, note Duoji first 
                                                 
3
 This point was highlighted in discussion with Stephen Trott, University of Toronto, at the Association 
of Chinese Political Studies, King’s College London, June 2011. 
4  This claim is based on analysis of available materials regarding the MLG. These materials 
included all MCA yearbooks as well as collected internally published collections of documents on the 
MLG (the Chengshi jumin zuidi shenghuo baozhang zhidu wenjian zike huibian referred to in the 
bibliography). During this time Duoji did deliver speeches on other aspects of the work of the MCA 
and in some cases the MLG was a specific part of a speech which touched on other aspects of the 
MCAs work. The indication is that whilst Duoji did focus on the MLG during this time, more so than 
other actors in the MCA, he was not focusing solely on this particular policy. 
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endorsed implementation in the first half of 1994. After 1994, as Duoji’s involvement 
intensified, the number of cities adopting a MLG system also increases (Hammond, 2009 and 
2011a). It is impossible to say how far the MLG would have diffused without the 
involvement of Duoji but the trajectory of implementation and the importance assigned to the 
Minister in interviews suggests that his involvement had a significant impact on the 
development of the MLG at the national level. 
 
Second, Duoji distinguished himself as an entrepreneur through the content of his actions. In 
1994 he shifted the policy on to the national agenda and pushed for implementation. At the 
10
th
 National Civil Affairs Conference he raised the MLG’s profile by mentioning it 
specifically. The exact status of the MLG at this point is unclear because in 1994 Duoji calls 
for the policy to be “progressively introduced” (zhuba shixing) (Duoji, 1995b) and although 
in later documents a number of terms used by Duoji imply the policy should be implemented, 
such as shixing and tuixing (Duoji, 1995d, Duoji, 1998d), there is no call by any authority 
higher than the MCA or the use of stronger language. A phrase used later for implementation 
of the MLG, guanche, is not used at all. State Councillors and other members of the 
Government are also absent in supporting the MLG during this period. The unclear position 
of the MLG is further supported by other written sources (Tang, 2003) and also interviews 
(Interviews with two social policy academics, Tianjin and Beijing, 2006) which suggest that 
at this time the MCA was pushing the policy without the explicit support of the State Council.  
 
This shift onto the national agenda occurred at the Tenth National Civil Affairs Congress held 
in May 1994 when the MLG was given a few lines in Duoji’s main speech, where he stated 
that the MCA should: “…target urban social assistance through the progressive introduction 
(zhuba shixing) of local minimum livelihood guarantee relief” (Duoji, 1995b: 24). There was 
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no other mention of the MLG and no reference to the system operating in Shanghai or any 
other model of the MLG that might be adopted. The MCA released a circular, a standard 
practice, which reported the speech and its contents throughout its bureaucracy and ensured 
that all involved in civil affairs work were aware of what Duoji had said. 
 
Although a minor mention, in a speech dominated by other concerns and MCA 
responsibilities, categorising the MLG as a policy to be introduced was a significant 
development. This is because, whilst a local level experiment, the MLG would have had 
neither widespread coverage nor official endorsement and this would limit the policy in terms 
of expansion. It would remain an option for local policy makers to implement if they were 
even aware of the policy. However, once it became a policy on the national agenda it gained 
both in terms of information being spread and from being endorsed by a central level 
authority. 
 
Having put the MLG on the national agenda Duoji worked to ensure that the policy remained 
there. This was managed through maintaining a visible presence supporting the policy in 
speeches (Duoji, 1998a, Duoji, 1998d, Duoji, 1998b, Duoji, 1998c), editorials in major party 
papers (Duoji, 1995d, Duoji, 1998e) and in the MCA’s own mouthpiece “China Society” 
(Zhongguo Shehui Bao) (Duoji, 1995a, Zhao, 1997, Duoji, 1997). Due to the unclear status of 
the MLG it occupied a grey area in the policy process. This was because, without the status 
associated with a State Council order to implement, the policy was an option which ought to 
be implemented rather than must be implemented. This meant that the MLG could arguably 
have slipped in terms of coverage and implementation if a certain level of activity was not 
maintained by interested parties and Duoji therefore provided important support for the 
measure.  
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Duoji was, however, unable to provide fiscal or legislative support for the policy because this 
would be impossible for a Minister. He could promote the policy in other ways. By 
maintaining a policy on the national agenda a Minister makes a very clear statement of intent. 
Duoji followed this by continuing to push for local government to adopt the MLG in spite of 
a lack of resources, limited central government support and local government opposition. His 
relative success, an overall increase in cities with MLG systems and eventually a State 
Council for national implementation, can be explained by the four qualities set out by 
Mintrom and Norman. 
 
Policy Entrepreneurship as Four Qualities 
Duoji had to deal with two significant institutional obstacles when promoting the MLG. 
Local government proved a stumbling block with provinces and cities resisting 
implementation or implementing systems which varied significantly.  Resistance to 
implementation was highlighted during an interview with one MCA official (Interview with 
MCA Researcher, Beijing, 2006) and also by the problem being addressed in speeches and 
editorials by Duoji at the time (Duoji, 1995d, Duoji, 1998a, Duoji, 1998d). The second 
problem was getting the highest levels of central government to support the MLG. Without 
the support of the State Council and other top tier elements of the bureaucracy implementing 
the MLG nationally would be impossible.  
 
In order to overcome local opposition to the MLG Duoji took two approaches. First he put 
forward a specific interpretation of the MLG policy to counter emerging arguments from 
local government about implementing the measure. Second, he intervened when possible in 
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the local policy making process. These actions clearly demonstrate Duoji’s social acuity, 
problem definition and willingness to lead by example. 
 
Social Acuity and Problem Definition 
As I have argued elsewhere local opposition to the MLG took four forms (Hammond, 2011a). 
First, some local Bureaux of Civil Affairs (BCA) felt that the MLG was not the responsibility 
of the MCA. Second, the MLG was too much work and too troublesome to be worthwhile. 
Third, it had no guidelines, no regulations and was unfamiliar. Finally, it was inappropriate in 
certain areas which were not very developed, fiscally poor but had a large population which 
would be entitled to the benefit (Duoji, 1998d). 
  
Duoji Cairang countered each of these points in speeches to Civil Affairs bureaucrats. The 
target audience of Duoji’s speeches on these problems reflected the limitations of influence 
that came with his position as a Minister. Although he could influence his own bureaucrats it 
was the local People’s Government and Finance Bureaux who would decide the introduction 
of a new policy. Duoji was making an effort to convince those he was responsible for and, 
perhaps, hoping that his officials would go on to push their particular city into implementing 
a MLG system. He was also demonstrating acuity by dealing with these concerns. In addition 
Duoji configured discussion of the MLG to fit with the problems affecting China and local 
government at the time. 
 
Duoji sought to overcome this local challenge with a comprehensive argument laid out in a 
number of speeches. He tied the MLG to the objective of ensuring social stability using the 
phrase baochi shehui wending (“maintaining social stability”) when outlining the benefits of 
the policy (Duoji, 1995d, Duoji, 1998d, Duoji, 1995a). Duoji also argued the MLG was a 
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policy which supported state responsibilities to the urban poor. This would encourage 
positive perceptions of the government arguing that: 
“…this work [the MLG] reflects the Party and government’s care for the masses and the 
superiority of the socialist system” (Duoji, 1998a: 29). 
And that: 
“Carrying out the urban resident MLG line system is important to both our nation and to 
guaranteeing human rights, because the right to life and to development are the most basic 
human rights. Carrying out the MLG is a major initiative for guaranteeing the right to live, it 
will have extensive and far reaching impacts both internationally and domestically” (Duoji, 
1998d: 33). 
 
Duoji also linked the MLG to one of the core policy concepts of the post-Mao era, the reform 
project. The MLG guaranteed the continuation of the reform process. In a speech to a 
symposium on the MLG Duoji stated that: “Establishing a complete social security system is 
an important project which complements the deepening of economic reforms and establishing 
a socialist market economic system” (Duoji, 1998d: 33). By configuring the debate 
surrounding the MLG in such a way Duoji ensured that resisting the MLG for whatever 
reason would be unlikely as it would be the equivalent of questioning doctrine. 
 
Duoji also argued that the MCA already had responsibility for China’s urban poor and the 
MLG was a continuity of this role. The MLG was presented as a reform of the existing Three 
Nos policy rather than a new policy (Duoji, 1995d, Duoji, 1998d). In one speech Duoji 
presented this argument as:  
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“We can very clearly say this work [the MLG] is a functional responsibility of the Ministry of 
Civil Affairs. Because the MLG is a reform of the traditional social assistance system it is not 
a new or increased responsibility” (Duoji, 1998d: 35).  
In the same speech Duoji argues that carrying out the MLG was not without guidelines and 
should not be troublesome because: “The practical experience of Shanghai, Dalian and other 
cities already answers the problem” (Duoji, 1998d: 36).  
 
The last point addressed was opposition based on varied levels of development. This elicited 
a practical response. The expectation of implementation was staggered allowing under 
developed areas more time to put in place MLG systems. Focus was put on those cities seen 
as developed – predominantly on the Eastern Seaboard and the self-governing municipalities. 
Those cities labelled as under developed, mainly in the Central-West of the country, were 
permitted to follow later when circumstances would allow it (Duoji, 1995d, Duoji, 1998c, Xi, 
1998). It should be noted that, given no national implementation order had been made, it was 
ambitious of Duoji to be pushing such an agenda at the time. 
 
Leading by Example 
Duoji also pushed the development of the MLG by intervening in local government. For 
example Duoji is cited as personally intervening in order to see the MLG implemented in 
Beijing. In this particular case it is implied that pressure was exerted on the government of 
Beijing to implement the MLG. Given the status of Beijing as the political heart of the 
Chinese state and one of the Municipalities it would have been of great significance if the city 
had not implemented the policy. In terms of seeking national implementation establishing a 
base in important localities would have benefitted the process. Not only would it have leant 
weight to the push for the policy to be established but it would also expand the experience, 
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methods and support that could be drawn upon when other cities began to implement (Liu, 
1997). 
 
In addition Duoji is cited by a report published in 2002 on the MLG in Liaoning as having 
intervened in the development of the policy in the Province. In this example Duoji suggested, 
in 1995, that the city of Dalian establish an MLG system to provide an example to the other 
cities in the area on how to set up and manage such a system (Zhang, 2002). The local 
government in Dalian subsequently established an MLG system which was used as an 
example for not only cities in Liaoning but also in the rest of China (Interview with MCA 
Researcher, Beijing, 2006). 
 
These interventions suggest that although Duoji might have been limited in his institutional 
capacity to push the MLG he was willing to take risks and lead by example. Duoji closely 
associated himself with local government adopting the innovation in the social assistance 
system. This was a risk because if the projects had failed or been censured then it would have 
negatively reflected on Duoji and potentially undermined his position as Minister. He was 
therefore taking a risk and leading by example when he pushed local government to adopt the 
MLG. The fact Duoji was able to do this suggests that he had two traits. First, Duoji was 
capable of persuading cities who were under no obligation to follow his instructions to 
implement MLG systems. This implies that he was either persuasive or had significant 
political capital in these cities where officials would listen to his suggestions. Second, Duoji 
may have been astute in tapping into the particular agendas of these cities when he made his 
interventions. It is entirely plausible that both Beijing and Dalian were at the time prepared to 
invest in establishing MLG systems because the cities were facing enterprise reforms and the 
potentially destabilising effects of increasing urban poverty, like Shanghai before them. 
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Team Building 
The final area where Duoji was able to help the MLG overcome institutional obstacles was 
by raising the profile of the program with the elite decision makers in the State Council. For 
the MLG to become national policy it would require the State Council to agree on 
implementation. The process and rationale of decision making at this level of Chinese politics 
is opaque at best but there is evidence to suggest that Duoji worked to support the MLG at the 
highest levels of the Chinese state. In the absence of obvious team building this use of 
professional networks fits with Mintrom and Norman’s framework. First, officials in the 
MCA stated that Duoji reported up to the State Council regarding the MLG; and Premier Li 
Peng was swayed by positive reports of the system (Interviews with Chinese social policy 
academic, Beijing, 2006; and with MCA Department Head, Beijing, 2007). Second, as 
discussed above, Duoji had been very careful in establishing the MLG as an ideologically 
sound response to issues such as poverty and unemployment which were arising as a result of 
reform. In addition the attempted management of the spread of the MLG had ensured that by 
1996 major cities like Beijing and Dalian, for example, had established systems and could be 
viewed as providing a network of systems in key cities and models to be examined. Taken 
together these points suggest that Duoji could have presented the MLG to the elite levels of 
government as a solution to emerging challenges. Given what MCA officials reported this 
appears to have been the case and would have gone some way, in combination with rising 
concerns regarding state owned enterprise reform, to overcoming the central government’s 
apparent apathy toward the program prior to 1996. This also demonstrates Duoji’s acuity and 
ability to define problems in a manner appealing to interested parties. 
 
Entrepreneur Motivations 
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Whilst it is not an important element in Mintrom and Norman’s framework the motivations of 
a policy entrepreneur are worth considering when describing their actions. The motivations of 
an individual, especially one who it is not possible to interview, is a challenging issue to 
understand but is possible to infer some motivations. First, I would argue that Duoji was not 
motivated by what might be called rational self-interest or a ministry building tendency. 
Although the MLG developed through the 1990s and 2000s to become a source of prestige 
and ultimately receive substantial central government spending after 2001 (MoF, 2005). This 
was not the case in the early to mid-1990s when the MLG was a risk for Duoji to support as 
he was asking local government to implement a policy with no resources to support it. This 
could have gone wrong for Duoji, politically, if he had aggravated provincial governors, city 
mayors and party secretaries. 
 
A more likely alternative motivation are pragmatic concerns born of increasing urban poverty 
and enterprise reform. This explains why the MLG was linked closely with the dominant 
government concern regarding social stability. Duoji was also in Tibet in 1989 and soon after 
moved to Beijing which would suggest he had firsthand experience of anti-government 
protests. Finally, as noted in his justifications for the MLG Duoji drew a clear ideological 
connection between socialism, the legitimacy of the Party and the MLG. Therefore the most 
likely reason for Duoji supporting the MLG was a combination of factors. Post-1989 
pragmatism and concerns over continued social stability fused with a strong ideological 
commitment to social assistance and socialist legitimacy. This combined with a concern for 
supporting the legitimacy of the Chinese state both in the domestic and international arenas to 
create a complex set of motivations for the Minister who pushed the MLG from 1994.  
 
Not all policy actors are policy entrepreneurs 
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Not all policy actors which are influential or important to the policy process are policy 
entrepreneurs. This is an important point to consider because the usefulness of policy 
entrepreneurship in describing outcomes would be diluted if every actor involved was an 
entrepreneur. As discussed earlier Mintrom and Norman highlight the need to be careful 
when applying the policy entrepreneur label cautioning that “indiscriminate application must 
be avoided” (2009: 650). In the case of the MLG there are examples of important policy 
actors active in the policy process who are not entrepreneurs. This section will highlight three 
different actors who were important to the MLG at different points but who were not 
entrepreneurs. Rather two different explanations are put forward for their behaviour.  
 
Jiang Zemin, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party 1997 – 2002, President of 
the PRC from 1998 – 2003 and China’s paramount leader after Deng Xiaoping died in 1997 
and Li Peng, Chinese Premier from 1993 to 1998, are both excellent examples of the 
temptation to make a policy actor an entrepreneur. Jiang Zemin’s support for the MLG was 
apparent because his institutional position in China meant that he would have needed to have 
at the very least agreed to national implementation in 1997. Jiang was also mentioned by one 
senior social policy researcher in China as being important to the MLG achieving national 
implementation in 1997 (Interview with Chinese Academy of Social Sciences researcher, 
Beijing, 2007). Li Peng has a similarly high profile regarding the MLG. He is cited in six 
interviews for his role in pushing the MLG after 1996 (Interviews with two social policy 
academics, Beijing, 2006; two social policy academics, Tianijn, 2006; Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences research, Beijing, 2007; MCA Researcher, Beijing, 2006; and MCA 
Department Head, 2007). Premier Li also reported positively on the MLG when it was 
incorporated into the ninth five year plan and during meetings (Li, 1998c). Finally, Li was a 
firm voice in the State Council pushing the MLG in the run up to national implementation (Li, 
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1998a). It is, therefore, clear that both were actors of some significance to the MLG being 
implemented in 1997. Why do I discuss them here as policy actors and not entrepreneurs? 
 
As discussed above entrepreneurs exhibit particular behaviour and for our pruposes are 
distinguished by their desire for change. The four reasons that Jiang Zemin should not be 
considered a policy sponsor are related to these requirements. First, with the exception of one 
interview (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Researcher, Beijing, 2007) there was no 
other mention of Jiang Zemin in interviews on the MLG. Jiang was not highlighted, like 
Duoji Cairang, as making an unusual contribution to the development of the MLG. Second, 
this lack of exceptional behaviour is reflected in the documentary sources with Jiang Zemin 
mentioning the MLG on only one occasion when reporting to the 15
th
 National Party 
Congress in September 1997 (Jiang, 1998). Third, his support for the MLG is inferred only 
by the requirement that he would need to “Okay” the policy because of his institutional 
position. In addition, the only time Jiang mentions the MLG is at the 15
th
 National Party 
Congress which does support the 1997 State Council Circular but it is after the decision to 
implement the policy had been made. Jiang’s involvement in the MLG does appear fleeting 
when compared to Duoji. Finally, an interview with a senior MCA official suggested that it 
was Li Peng who persuaded the other elite leaders to implement the MLG nationally 
(Interview with MCA Department Head, Beijing, 2007). Jiang was not mentioned and the 
implication is that he was one of those in the State Council who was persuaded rather than an 
essential actor who did the persuading. Jiang therefore cannot be considered an entrepreneur. 
His role in the MLG was short lived, reactive and did not demonstrate a clear desire to 
change the system. Although a powerful policy actor, in the case of the MLG Jiang can be 
considered as “just doing his job.” 
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Premier Li Peng presents a more difficult case because he did make interventions which 
appear both significant and cover a period of time. His first comment on the MLG came in 
1994 at the same meeting Duoji first promoted the MLG (Li, 1995) and he periodically 
appears regarding the MLG all the way through to the ninth five year plan and national 
implementation (Li, 1998b, Li, 1998a, Li, 1998c). Although highlighted in interviews as 
being a key actor in the development of the MLG and making interventions in the process 
more often than Jiang appears he does not distinguish himself for two reasons. First, although 
involved over a significant period of time it is sporadic and only intensifies near to national 
implementation. Li does not show a clear long term commitment to change. Second, Li only 
makes decisions on the MLG in contrast to Duoji who pushed and promoted the policy. This 
again highlights a limited albeit significant role in the development of the MLG. 
 
There is one other example which helps highlight this difference. Zou Jiahua publicly 
supported the MLG but only when the State Council announced the measure in September 
1997. Although used to publicise the MLG there was no evidence of a sustained interest in 
policy. Although Zou is high profile in 1997 on the MLG he is not during the period before 
or after the announcement of the Circular. A possible explanation for supporting the measure 
is that Zou was a known ally of Li Peng (Fewsmith, 2008). Speculatively, he may have 
supported the measure out of support for Li when he was overseeing national implementation 
in 1997.  
 
Conclusion 
This article has examined the application of Mintrom and Norman’s policy entrepreneur and 
policy change framework as a means to describe and explain the role of Minister Duoji 
Cairang in the development of dibao in the PRC. This discussion initially highlighted the on-
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going evolution of understanding of policy and the roles for policy actors in the PRC. In 
particular the elite factionalism, group and fragmented authoritarianism models were all 
discussed as evidence of a developing understanding of policy in the PRC. In addition this 
body of work suggests that the policy process in China is more complicated than previously 
acknowledged. Recent scholarship has introduced new concepts to the debate on Chinese 
policy and this article focuses on the policy entrepreneur. These studies of policy 
entrepreneurs are associated with the agenda settings stage of the policy process but 
demonstrate the transfer and application of the concept in the PRC (Mertha, 2009, Zhu, 2008). 
 
It is this new work on policy entrepreneurs that this article contributes to. In this article I use 
the framework set out by Mintrom and Norman because it provides a single framework for 
identifying and describing the success of a policy entrepreneur. Mintrom and Norman’s 
framework describes the qualities that might explain the success or failure of a policy 
entrepreneur: acuity, problem definition, leading by example and team building (2009). I use 
this framework to describe the development of the MLG and Minister Duoji Cairang’s 
relative success in pushing for significant change in social assistance policy in China. This 
article therefore addresses two questions: first, does the policy entrepreneur concept 
adequately describe the development of urban dibao; second, does Mintrom and Norman’s 
framework provide the means to identify, describe and evaluate the success of policy 
entrepreneurship in China without modification? 
 
The evidence provided in this paper suggests that in the case of both questions the answer is a 
qualified yes. In terms of the policy entrepreneur adequately describing the development of 
the MLG the concept has clear advantages to an approach based on, for example, the 
fragmented authoritarianism or elite factionalism models.  This is for three reasons. First, the 
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policy entrepreneur is more dynamic in describing the behaviour of bureaucrats than 
alternatives. In the alternative models a ministerial bureaucrat would be a static actor, the 
rational decision maker of the FA model, or ignored altogether when there is ample evidence 
that they can have a significant impact on the policy process. Duoji promoted the MLG when 
it was not a popular policy, over a significant period of time and across multiple stages of the 
policy process. Second, policy entrepreneurship can allow for what might appear as non-
rational behaviour in a policy actor. Why does a policy actor support a policy which 
apparently does not best serve their interests at the time? Perhaps they are supporting it taking 
a long term view? Or acting under ideological motivations? In the case of Duoji supporting 
dibao when he did could be viewed as an irrational choice given the risks in aggravating local 
government with an unfunded mandate. Third, policy entrepreneurship provides a means to 
synthesise the impact that policy actors and institutional features of the Chinese state can 
have on policy outcomes. For example Duoji’s position as a minister limited him in his 
actions but also provided, in the fragmented Chinese system, the space to promote the MLG. 
 
The second question is whether Mintrom and Norman’s framework can be used in the 
Chinese context without modification? The evidence produced here would support the 
argument that the framework can be used to describe cases of policy entrepreneurship and 
policy change in the PRC. Each of the four aspects of the framework worked in terms of 
providing an explanation for the success of Minister Duoji in promoting the MLG during the 
1990s. The only aspect which was limited was the description of team building which did not 
directly fit Duoji’s activities. The use of his professional networks, howver, was an aspect of 
Duoji’s work in promoting the MLG and this does fit with the general idea behind team 
building. Overall the framework provides a clear means to identify policy entrepreneurs and 
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also provides four key aspects with which to describe the success, or arguably the failure, of a 
policy entrepreneur. 
 
This is, however, only a single case exploring the potential usefulness of Mintrom and 
Norman’s framework which means the evidence presented here cannot be an argument for a 
general application in the Chinese context. In order to more rigorously explore the 
possibilities presented by the framework it needs to be used to describe other cases. Because 
of the relative simplicity and clarity of the framework it has great potential. In addition the 
framework can describe policy actors who influence the policy process from both within and 
outside of the bureaucracy. This would take our understanding of non-state policy actors 
beyond the agenda setting stage within which the traditional concept of the policy 
entrepreneur occupies. Although briefly touched on in this article the potential for better 
understanding the policy process in the PRC presented by the policy entrepreneur are great. 
 
Appendix A 
List of interviewees (anonymous, in line with ethical agreement). 
1. Researcher, Beijing. 
2. Official, Ministry of Science and Technology. 
3. Researcher, Tianjin. 
4. Researcher, Tianjin. 
5. Official, People's Government, Anqing. 
6. Official, Anqing Development Zone. 
7. MLG Recipient, Anqing. 
8. 2 Researchers, Beijing. 
9. 3 Researchers, Beijing. 
10. NGO Official, Beijing. 
11. Official, MCA, Beijing. 
12. Researcher, Beijing. 
13. NGO Official, Beijing. 
14. Researcher, HK SAR. 
15. Researcher, HK SAR. 
16. Researcher, Beijing. 
17. Official, Civil Affairs, Dalian. 
18. Official, MCA, Beijing. 
 
Appendix B 
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Coding frame (edited for length). 
000. Institutional Codes: 
001. State Council. 
002. MCA. 
003. MoLSS. 
004. MoF. 
005. MoP. 
006. Statistics. 
007. Pricing. 
008. Supervisory. 
009. National Development 
and Reform Commission. 
010. Development Research 
Centre of State Council PRC. 
011. CASS. 
012. National People’s 
Congress. 
013. Standing committee of the 
National People’s Congress. 
014. Renmin Ribao. 
015. Jingji Ribao. 
016. Shehui Bao. 
100. Administrative Codes: 
101. Ministry(ies). 
102. Department(s). 
103. Bureau(x). 
104. Province(s). 
105. Autonomous Region(s)/ 
107. Municipality(ies). 
108. City(ies). 
109. County(ies). 
110. District(s). 
111. Street Committee(s). 
112. Shequ/ Community(ies). 
113. Residence Committee(s). 
200. Party Codes: 
201. CCP/ CPC/ Chinese 
Communist Party. 
202. CCP Consultative 
Congress. 
203. National Party Congress. 
204. Standing Committee of 
the National Party Congress. 
205. Politburo. 
300. People: 
301. Mao Zedong. 
302. Deng Xiaoping. 
303. Jiang Zemin. 
304. Zhu Rongji. 
305. Li Peng. 
306. Li Guixian. 
307. Zou Jiahua. 
308. Hu Jintao. 
309. Wen Jiabao. 
310. Wu Bangguo. 
311. Doge Cerang/ Duoji 
Cairang. 
312. Fan Baojun. 
313. Li Bengong. 
314. Yang Yanyin. 
315. Tang Jun. 
316. Guan Xinping. 
400. Titles: 
401. Chairman. 
402. President. 
403. Premier. 
404. Vice-Premier. 
405. Minister. 
406. Vice-Minister. 
407. Comrade. 
500. Legislative Codes: 
501. 1982 Constitution. 
502. 1997 Circular (Guofa 
1997 – 29). 
503. 1999 Circular (Minjiufa 
1999 – 4). 
504. 1999 MLG Regulations. 
505. Minfa 2000 – 11. 
600. Policy Codes: 
601. “Economic reform and 
development.” 
602. “Socialist Market 
Economy with Chinese 
characteristics.” 
603. “Social Stability.” 
604. Poor population (poor 
population’s living difficulties). 
605. 8th Five Year Plan. 
606. 9th Five Year Plan. 
607. 10th Five Year Plan. 
608. 11th Five Year Plan. 
609. 2010 Goals. 
610. Social Security. 
611. Social Welfare. 
612. Social Assistance. 
613. MLG. 
614. XG BLG. 
615. UEI. 
616. OAP/ Basic Retirement 
Pensions. 
617. Basic Medical Insurance. 
618. Education fee assistance. 
619. Rent assistance. 
620. Social Insurance. 
621. Medical Insurance. 
622. Final Security Net. 
623. 3 Lines of Social Security. 
624. 6 Parts of Social Security. 
700. Theory Codes: 
701.Fragmented 
Authoritarianism. 
720. 4 Part Institutionalism. 
740. SL-PNA. 
750. PE. 
751. PE Identify 
752. PE SA 
753. PE PD 
754. PE Leading 
755. PE T-Building 
756. PE Refutes 
800. Statistics Codes: 
801. Money/ Funding. 
820. MLG Target Numbers. 
840. MLG Level. 
900. Location Codes: 
901. China. 
902. International. 
903. England/ UK. 
904 - 935. Chinese Provinces 
and Municipalities. 
 
1000. Terminology Codes: 
1001. Research. 
1002. Investigate. 
1003. Funding. 
1004. Targets. 
1005. Ideology/ Ideological. 
1006. Pragmatic/ Pragmatism. 
1007. Strengthen. 
1008. Pushing/ promoting. 
1009. Playing games. 
1010.Incremental.
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